

Counterinsurgency Progress in North Babil Some Indicators of Impact



Overview of CERP, QRF & USAID Funding and Counterinsurgency Indicators in North Babil, Iraq Nov. 2006 – August 2008





USAID Iraq Agricultural Sector Support

Inma Project


Iraq Rapid Assistance Project

Community Stabilization Project

Tatweer Project


Tijara

Michael Maxey Sr. Ag. Advisor Economic Growth and Ag. Office USAID Iraq




USAID Iraq 2008

Counter-insurgency & Development Programs \$1.7 billion



Conflict-to-Peace Continuum



WAR/CONFLICT

Iraqi Rapid Assistance Program

 \$130 million – Approximately \$100 million available for projects developed at PRT and ePRT level.

Relatively small projects targeting high conflict areas.

Counter-insurgency focus.

Community Stabilization Program

 \$544 million – Close coordination with PRt & ePRT

 Relatively small projects targeting high conflict areas.

Counter-insurgency focus.

Community Action Program II

- \$150 million Info shared with PRT
 & ePRT (under radar screen)
 - Citizen Action Groups

Focus on local ownership

Focus on community mobilization

Local Governance II

\$359 million


Focus on local capacity building

 Technical assistance – governance, economic growth and essential services

Inma, Tijara & Economic Governance

- Longer term focus.
- Sustainable Development.
- Targets key markets & interventions.

Addresses larger sector issues.



Money as a Weapon

North Babil Counterinsurgency and Development Funding.

> \$34 million committed to essential services, social and economic development programs over a 10 month period – 12/2007 through 09/2008



Money as a weapon – fish farm program ePRT North Babil 2008.

What happened in North Babil?

- What was impact of CERP funding?
- Was there a different response to different types of CERP funding?
- What was the impact of Economic Development funding (USAID & QRF)?
- What other factors promoted greater local cooperation and a reduction in violence?

North Babil – Increase in USAID Funding – Feb. to Sept. 2008

USAID Programs – Feb. 2008 US\$2.6 million

Economic Development

Community Action Program (CAP) II – Small business financing, infrastructure improvement, & victim compensation. \$580,000 invested (Oct. 2007 – May 2008) benefitting 8,726 people.

<u>IZDIHAR</u> – Support provided for local business training from Small Business Development Center in Hillah. Non-USAID funds used to finance business training in coordination with the SBDC established by IZDIHAR.

Governance

Community Action Program (CAP) II – School, health clinics, and infrastructure improvement. \$1,923,000 invested (Oct. 2007 – May 2008) benefitting 34,105 people.

Local Government Program (LGP) II – Over 1,200 hours of training* provided to council members and staff in budget planning and execution, participation in provincial planning process, and design of local economic development strategy. * 4 hrs training per week over 24 week period with average of 13 students per class

USAID Programs – September 2008 US\$13.4 million

Economic Development

Community Action Program (CAP) II – Expand small business financing, infrastructure improvement, & victim compensation. \$580,000 invested (Oct. 2007 – May 2008) benefitting 8,726 people.

<u>Community Stabilization Program</u> – Support provided to Iskandariya Votech jobs training program. 1,000 additional students trained. \$8 million allocated for North Babil with \$5.3 million already funding local programs.

<u>IRAP (Iraqi Rapid Assistance Program)</u> – Fifteen projects approved for \$3 million for business training, microfinance and marketing programs, school supplies, and reconstruction.

INMA (Ag Production & Marketing Program) – Approval and start of implementation of Iskandariya Fish Farms Program – Expansion of Euphrates Fish Farm (Hillah) to North Babil to support production and marketing of 2,000 hectares of fish farms directly benefitting 14,000. \$2.0 million invested in fish fingerlings contract to supply 3 million fingerlings to North Babil and conduct fish production demonstrations.

Governance


Community Action Program (CAP) II – Expand school, health clinics, and infrastructure improvement. \$2.5 million invested through May 2008

<u>Local Government Program (LGP) II</u> – Expand training with strong focus on budget planning and execution, participation in provincial planning process, and design of local economic development strategy. Seek greater dedicated Technical Assistance for North Babil area.




USAID Quarterly Funding – North Babil August 2007 – September 2008






IRAP Grants

| Provinces | Grants | Value | Civil Society Conflict Mitigation |
|-------------|--------|-------------|-----------------------------------|
| Madain | 5 | 525,690 | Grants Value |
| Mahmoudiyah | 8 | 913,313 | |
| North Babil | 15 | 3,101,100 | 1 \$197,960 |
| Babil | 10 | 1,301,272 | |
| Karbala | 1 | 47,145 | |
| Diwaniyah | 2 | 147,510 | 1 \$40,892 |
| Wasit | 6 | \$1,232,965 | |
| Dhi Qar | 3 | \$339,125 | 1 \$135,183 |
| Maysan | 9 | \$647,377 | |
| Muthanna | 3 | \$562,285 | 1 \$167,075 |



USAID Funding – North Babil August 2007 – September 2008




Impact of CERP, USAID and QRF Funding

"Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq"*


- Major Finding CERP funding in counterinsurgency areas increased the willingness of the people to cooperate with government forces.
- As government services and quality of life improved, local citizens shared more information with the government forces.
- As information sharing went up, effectiveness of counterinsurgency went up and violence (against government forces) went down.

*Study conducted by Eli Berman, UCSD; Jacob Shapiro, Princeton University; & Joseph Felter, USMA. Draft Paper available for download at http://www.princeton.edu/politics/events/repository/public/faculty/Shapiro_PolMeth_Sept08.pdf


Information Flow vs SigActs - North Babil



Total CERP & USAID/QRF Funding – North Babil




CERP SOI vs SigActs – North Babil




Monthly Commitment of Funds by USAID Partners in North Babil

August 2007 – September 2008



USAID/QRF Funding vs SigActs – North Babil



Questions

- What other factors played a role in reduction of SigActs or improvement of information flow?
- Does the transition strategy of SOI to private jobs or recruitment into the army model the potential impact on violence if effort is unsuccessful?
- Has SOI program bought time for move to sustainable economic development or is it a separate and required mechanism to maintain lower violence levels?
- What are we learning here that might be applicable elsewhere?

Role of Sectarian Cleansing

 Baghdad Nights Study – How to look at this type of data across Iraq.

 Example of Al Qaeda of Mesopotami destroying pump stations on Tigris River to drive out the Shi'a in North Babil AO.

"They made a desert and called it peace."



"Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."


Tacitus' "Agricola"

How can we map impact?


 Looking at ways to map events and information in area of operation.

 Potential of geo-tagged mapping – MetaCarta.

MetaCarta http://metacarta.com/



MetaCarta



How can we assess impact?

 Qualitative Evaluation – Survey on attitudes and local perception of most critical factors.

 Analytical Framework – How to address the endogeneity of treatment?

What's next?

To Be Continued ...



North Babil ePRT – 4th Brigade Combat Team – 3rd Infantry Division October 2008